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Introduction
One of the most fundamental questions in financial economics is what drives asset prices and volatility. Both quantities are believed to change due to the arrival of new information.
In this context it is useful to distinguish between public and private information. Public information concerns news that becomes available to all market participants at the same point in time, for example in the form of announcements of important macroeconomic variables. As all investors will be equally informed at the same time, the arrival of public information typically causes an immediate change in asset prices and volatility.
1 Private information refers to news that is distributed asymmetrically amongst market participants.
The presence of such private information may be revealed by the trading process and changes in the asset price itself, as informed investors may buy or sell the asset based on their privately held knowledge. Other investors observe the trading process and make inferences on this private information, giving rise to further price adjustments.
2
The effect of public information on prices and volatility and the effect of private information on prices have been established for many financial markets. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2007), for example, document the link between public information releases and prices and volatility in foreign exchange, Treasury and equity markets. Based on high-frequency intraday data they demonstrate that surprises in macro announcements (i.e. the difference between the actual release and the consensus market expectation) affect the conditional mean and volatility of exchange rates, treasuries and stocks. Recent literature also documents a relation between private information and prices for equity (see, e.g., Hasbrouck (1991) ), foreign exchange (see, e.g., Evans and Lyons (2008) ), and the Treasury market (see, e.g., Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) , Green (2004) and Pasquariello and Vega (2007) ).
The goal of this paper is to examine whether private information also influences the volatility of assets. We investigate this issue empirically for the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond 1 The literature on the effects of public information on asset prices and volatility dates back to French and Roll (1986) and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1989) , and includes important contributions by Ederington and Lee (1993) , Berry and Howe (1994) , Fleming and Remolona (1999) 2 This idea was first formalized by Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) .
futures. We conduct our analysis in a comprehensive framework that allows us to control for the effects of both public and private information on prices and the effects of public information on volatility. Our results demonstrate that proxies for the level of private information, such as order flow and bid-ask spread, do indeed affect volatility. Specifically, a larger degree of information asymmetry increases the uncertainty surrounding Treasury futures prices. This positive relation between private information and volatility is significant in both statistical and economic terms. For example, the average effect of order flow on daily volatility is around 80 basis points. Interestingly, we find that the effect of private information on volatility is considerably larger than the effect of public information in the form of macroeconomic news announcements. Among the 24 announcements that are included in the analysis, Nonfarm Payroll Employment is found to have the strongest impact on volatility. A one standard deviation surprise in an announcement of this variable increases daily volatility by only 17 basis points, which is more than four smaller than the effect of a comparable shock in order flow. The evident implication of our findings is that the level of private information should not be ignored when modeling and forecasting volatility.
We provide two extensions to analyze the robustness of our main result that private information affects volatility. First, we find that the effect of private information depends on the state of the economy, in the sense that the effect of the bid-ask spread on volatility is higher during contractions. Second, the effect of private information on volatility depends on the heterogeneity of analysts' expectations concerning upcoming public information releases.
Order flow is found to influence volatility to a greater extent in times characterized by a high level of dispersion of beliefs.
We use a high-frequency data set consisting of transaction prices and volumes for the 30- has the advantage that public information is aptly captured by macroeconomic news releases and thus easily tracked and measured. The availability of analysts' forecasts for each macro announcement provides an estimate of the market consensus, which in turn can be used to construct the surprise component of each news release.
The idea of private information in the Treasury market needs some further clarification.
The conventional interpretation of private information, as typically applied to individual stocks and corporate bonds, is advance knowledge of firm-related news, concerning earnings announcements, new investment projects, or changes in management, among others.
Obviously, this interpretation does not apply to treasuries. Green (2004) provides several alternatives for the interpretation of private information in the Treasury market, such as information about endowments or the interpretation of macroeconomic news due to differential information processing skills. Despite the different interpretation, we can use similar variables to proxy private information in the Treasury market as commonly used for equities. We consider two such variables in our empirical analysis. First, we use order flow or net buying pressure (defined as the difference between the volume in buyer-initiated transactions and the volume in seller-initiated transactions) as a measure that could reveal heterogeneous information to the market. Second, we use the bid-ask spread. This latter proxy is more noisy than the former as it may include other liquidity determinants beyond private information (such as trader inventory effects).
Apart from uncovering the effect of private information on volatility as such, our study also contributes to the methodology for analyzing information effects on asset returns and volatility. We develop a modeling framework that allows us to simultaneously assess the effects of public and private information on return and volatility. Specifically, we propose a model specifying the dynamics of both returns and volatility in such a way that both equations can be estimated jointly. We split volatility in two (multiplicative) components, following the Spline-GARCH model of Engle and Rangel (2008 In contrast to these two papers, in our work the term volatility implies a parameterization of the conditional volatility. Jiang and Lo (2011) use a Markov-Switching framework to identify the probability of private information flow, also from the return equation, and find that volatility is high when this probability is high controlling for other liquidity (shock)
variables. Second, our work relates to the analysis of returns, volatility, liquidity and order flow, as in Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) . One of their main findings is that volatility shocks are informative for predicting shifts in liquidity, highlighting the interrelation between the two. We focus on the reverse relationship and extend their work by investigating specifically the role of private information on volatility. We take order flow as the private information measure to be able to rely on economic theory that predicts causality from order flow to prices (as in Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) ). Alternatively, one could look at the relation between volume and volatility as in Andersen (1996) .
Finally, our analysis of private information effects on volatility relates to the literature on the effects of buying-and selling-pressure in options markets (see, e.g., Bollen and Whaley (2004) and Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2009)). To take out price differences due to option contract specification (such as strike and maturity) the focus in this literature is typically on volatility rather than option prices directly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and presents summary statistics. Section 3 describes the joint modeling framework for analyzing the effects of public and private information on returns and volatility. Corresponding empirical results are also provided in this section. Section 4 reports extensions of the main analysis, allowing for the effects of public and private information to depend on the level of disagreement among analysts concerning upcoming public information releases or on the state of the economy. Section 5 concludes.
Data and summary statistics
We combine two data sets to study the public and private information sources of volatility.
In the following three subsections we discuss the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond futures data, the variables that we use as proxies for the presence of private information in the market, and the public information variables as constructed from expectations and announcements of macroeconomic fundamentals. In the final subsection, we provide a preliminary idea about the effects of public and private information on the Treasury futures returns and volatility, focusing on the announcements of Nonfarm Payroll Employment.
U.S. Treasury bond futures data
We employ a high-frequency data set of intraday transaction prices and volumes of 30-year the next three consecutive contracts can be traded. 3 We construct a single time series of transaction prices and volumes using the most nearby contract, which is the most intensely traded and is a close substitute for the underlying spot instrument. We roll over to the next contract when its daily tick volume exceeds the daily tick volume of the most nearby contract. This generally occurs between five to three days before expiration of the nearestto-maturity contract. Our data set records the timestamp (in seconds), price and volume for each transaction. 4 We aggregate the data to 5-minute intervals. 5 For computing returns we use the last observed transaction price in each intraday interval. Overnight returns are excluded.
Private information variables
It is generally not possible to directly measure private information. In our study we use two variables that are commonly used to proxy private information, namely order flow and the bid-ask spread. We follow Pasquariello and Vega (2007) by using the unanticipated portion of aggregate order flow, as microstructure imperfections can cause lagged effects in the observed order flow, see Hasbrouck (2004a) . Taking N t as the number of trades in interval t and v t,j as the volume of the j-th trade in this interval, we first calculate our measure of order flow, denoted OF t , as
where q t,j = 1 if the j-th trade is initiated by a buyer and −1 if it is initiated by a seller. We standardize the order flow by scaling it by the sample standard deviation. Related to the definition of order flow OF t as given above, this measure is also referred to as the 'signed' trading volume. In a second step, we estimate an appropriate ARMA model to remove the 'expected' order flow. Our second measure for private information is the bid-ask spread during a certain interval. This proxy may be slightly more noisy, as it could also include inventory costs and order processing costs beyond effects due to asymmetric (private) information. 8 A high bid-ask spread may imply a low level of liquidity, which could be due to a high level of information asymmetry. As our data set only comprises transaction prices, we need to estimate the bid-ask spread. We do so by taking the difference between the (volume-weighted) buy price and the average sell price during a particular interval, see also Manaster and Mann (1996) .
We remove spread estimates that are negative and trim observations that exceed the 99.5th
percentile of the empirical distribution to avoid having noisily measured spreads dominating our results.
Public information variables
An advantage of studying the Treasury market is that public information affecting the prices and volatility is readily identified: these are the scheduled releases of macroeconomic variables. We use data on expectations and announcements of 24 key U.S. macro variables. This data is obtained from Econoday, 9 and feeds the information that is published on Bloomberg.
The data on the actual released values comes from Haver Analytics. We derive our proxy for the market expectation from analysts' forecasts, which stem from Market News Interna- 6 We perform the analysis also by using order flow as defined in (1). This does not affect the main results. 7 For robustness, we also use the tick-test (Lee and Ready, 1991) , which determines the sign based on the relation of the current trade price to the previous trade price. If a trade occurs at a price higher (lower) than the previous trade a trade is called an up-tick (down-tick), and is assumed to be initiated by the buying (selling) party. The main results do not change when we use the bid-ask spread based on the tick-test. 8 See for example Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2005), who survey the literature on the analysis of the price formation and trading process. 9 See http://www.econoday.com/.
tional and Thomson Financial. In order to obtain the analysts' forecasts the aforementioned companies hold a survey amongst a number of analysts for the announcements that are to come in the following week. The data set records the median of these forecasts, which provides an estimate of the market consensus. In addition, we have the lowest and highest analysts' forecasts for each announcement from June 2007 onwards.
We follow the existing literature (see, e.g., Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001)) by considering the surprise in each announcement. This surprise is constructed as the difference between the actual released value and the consensus analysts' forecast. Since units of measurement vary widely across macroeconomic variables, we standardize the surprises by dividing by their sample standard deviation. Hence the surprise S k,t in the announcement of variable k at time t is
where A k,t denotes the announced value, M k,t is the median of analyst forecasts, and σ k is the sample standard deviation of their difference. 
Public and private information effects: A first impression

Modeling the response of Treasury futures to public and private information
In this section we describe the methodology that we adopt to examine the effects of private information on the volatility of the 30-year Treasury bond futures. We recognize that it is crucial to control for the effects of public and private information on returns as well as the effects of public information on volatility. To accomplish this, we propose a model specifying the dynamics of both returns and volatility in such a way that both equations can be estimated jointly. We develop our general modeling framework in different stages. First, 
Public and private information matter for returns
We adopt the approach of Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003, 2007) , ABDV hereafter. We assume a linear model specification for the 5-minute returns on the 30-year Treasury bond futures, including I autoregressive terms and J lags of the announcement surprises of each of the K macroeconomic fundamentals. In addition, we include L lags of K ′ private information variables, such that the model reads
for t = 1, . . . , T where R t is the 5-minute return from time t − 1 to time t, S k,t is the standardized surprise of announcement k at time t as defined in (2) 
where R t is the 5-minute log return of 30-year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t − 1 to t, S k,t is the standardized surprise of announcement type k, k = 1, . . . , 24 and OF * t denotes the unanticipated order flow. We include a dummy variable that equals one on announcement days. The first column presents results of the regression where only public information is included. The second column provide results of the regression that contains both public and private information. The superscripts * * * , * * and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively, where the significance is assessed using Newey-West standard errors. The sample goes from 
while the macroeconomic surprises are only included contemporaneously with the return during the first 5-minutes following the announcements, they do affect subsequent returns through the autoregressive terms.
In line with earlier research (e.g., ABDV (2007), Table 5A ) we find that many of the fundamentals have a significant effect on bond futures returns. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients is not affected by the inclusion of the private information variables.
We explain the reaction of the bond market to macroeconomic news mainly in terms of revi- Considering the importance of macroeconomic announcements in terms of explanatory power for the 5-minute returns, the R 2 of the specification (3) is rather small at 0.019. This is somewhat misleading though, since these announcements occur relatively rarely, in the sense that the number of observations for which a surprise actually occurs is only a very small fraction of the total sample size. To highlight the importance of macro news during the announcement periods, we estimate the simplified model
using only those observations when an announcement of variable k was made at time t.
The estimation results for the 24 different announcements are shown in 
where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond futures from period t − 1 to t. We include only the pairs (R t , S k,t ) when an announcement of fundamental k was made at time t. The superscripts * * * , * * and * donate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The sample goes from capturing the intraday pattern of volatility, that is,
where |ǫ t | is the absolute value of the residual of equation (3) (5) remains positive but becomes very small, the corresponding observations receive a disproportionally large weight in the FWLS estimation of the return specification (3), which may not be desirable. A second issue is that the ABDV two-step approach neglects parameter uncertainty of the conditional mean equation when estimating the volatility equation. As we are particularly interested in the effects of public and private information on volatility, it is important to take this uncertainty into account.
We overcome both econometric issues discussed above by using a GARCH-type approach, see also De Goeij and Marquering (2006) and Brenner, Pasquariello and Subrahmanyam (2009). We deviate from these studies by adopting the basic idea of the Spline-GARCH model developed by Engle and Rangel (2008) to decompose the conditional volatility in two (multiplicative) parts. One of these components is a standard GARCH term (but normalized to have unconditional mean equal to one) to capture high-frequency movements in volatility. In Engle and Rangel (2008) , the other component captures low-frequency movements in volatility, which is achieved by using a quadratic spline function of time t.
For the purpose of our analysis, we specify the second component such that it describes the intra-day volatility pattern (by means of a Fourier series) and the effects of public and private information. Combined with the return equation from the ABDV approach, i.e. (3), the complete model specification is given by
where u t ∼ N(0, 1), the conditional variance E[ǫ 2 t |I t−1 ] = g t τ t with I t the information set at time t, g t represents the unit-GARCH term and τ t denotes the joint public and private news component. We include both unanticipated order flow and the bid-ask spread as private news proxies. The exponential specification of τ t obviously avoids that the conditional variance can become negative by construction.
An important difference between the specification of the Spline-GARCH model and the augmented-GARCH model of de Goeij and Marquering (2006) is that the latter model implies by definition a permanent effect of surprises on volatility. This is the result of introducing a dummy variable that accounts for the announcements in the GARCH equation. A high value of β GA implies then the permanent effect of public information on volatility. The Spline-GARCH model however allows us to control for the length of the effect of the surprises; we simply add lags of surprises in the specification of τ t , which does not permanently influence g t . Hence we are able to distinguish between the effect of private information on volatility and the effect of macroeconomic surprises on volatility.
We estimate all parameters in the model (6) simultaneously, by (quasi) maximum likelihood. Given the large number of parameters, this can be a tough non-linear maximization problem. For this reason we first estimate (3) and (5) by OLS, and use the resulting coefficient estimatesas meaningful starting values for the maximization of the likelihood. 12 In addition, we reduce the computational burden by estimating the conditional likelihood: first we estimate the volatility parameters while holding the return parameters fixed, and vice versa. In a final step we optimize the joint likelihood. Table 4 provides estimation results for the GARCH model in (6) Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients for the surprises in macro announcements. We only report the public information coefficients for the most general specification that includes both order flow and the bid-ask spread. In the other three specifications the surprise coefficients are comparable. The results indicate that 15 out of the 24 announcement surprises significantly affect subsequent returns, where in general the same reasoning holds as described in the discussion about Table 2 , i.e. procyclical variables cause a negative 12 In more detail, we transform the estimated coefficients of (5) by taking the exponent as a result of the specification of the volatility part of the spline GARCH model. 13 The Akaike and Schwarz criteria propose Q = 5 and J ′ = 0 in the 'ABDV approach', which is used for meaningful starting values. However, a bottom-up procedure, i.e. including a lag of each public news variable until the F-test of joint significance of all estimated coefficients cannot be rejected, allows for one lag. To be sure that we do not miss any information of lagged public news surprises, we set J ′ equal to one in the 'ABDV approach'. 
where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t − 1 to t, S k,t is the standardized news announcement for k = 1, . . . , 24 and P t and OF * t denote the bid-ask spread and the unanticipated order flow from period t to t + 1. Further, I = 3, J = 0, J ′ = 1 and Q = 5. In Panel A we report parameter estimates corresponding with private news for four various specifications, whereas panel B provides the public news coefficients of the last specification. The superscripts * * * , * * , and * donate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample goes from 
Figure 2: Intraday volatility effects
This figure depicts the intraday effects that capture the high-frequency pattern of deviations of intraday volatility from its daily average, as estimated in the Spline-GARCH model defined in (6) . In addition, the figure depicts 95% confidence bounds. We find that almost all macro surprises affect volatility in the first five minutes after the announcement, whereas some variables also have a significant impact on volatility during the next five minutes. The impact of public information on volatility is less short-lived compared to the impact on returns, although a likelihood-ratio test indicates only one lag of the macro announcement variables is required. Figure 2 depicts the Fourier series that captures the intraday deviations from the daily volatility. Typically, when floor trading starts, volatility is relatively high, whereas during lunch and after closing time (15:00) volatility is relatively low. Incorporating this deterministic pattern contributes substantially to explaining the intraday behavior of volatility. Table 5 shows the economic significance of the estimated coefficients of the Spline-GARCH model. We take the three most influential news announcements on volatility, GDP Advance, Nonfarm Payroll Employment and the CPI, and compute the partial derivative of the volatility with respect to these announcements. In addition, we include Initial Unemployment Claims. Recall that news announcements occur rarely, while order flow and the bid-ask spread are available at each 5-minute interval. We add up the influence of private variables on the volatility over a whole day to compare both public and private variables in an economically meaningful way. Specifically, we add up all values of the square root of τ t over all intraday intervals including both private and public variables and subtract the sum of the volatilities without including the public variables.
The most striking result is the daily impact of the private information proxies. Unanticipated order flow and the bid-ask spread increase on average the daily volatility by 80 and 75 basis points respectively. This number is robust against special announcement releases, as we average it out over all 1,509 trading days. This is quite large compared to the effect of public information variables. Nonfarm Payroll Employment releases are the most influential news announcements: A one standard deviation change in the surprise implies on average an increase of 17 basis points of the volatility. The economic significance of the GDP advance and the CPI index is of the same order, whereas a release of the Initial Unemployment This table provides economic significance of the volatility part of the Spline-GARCH model:
where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t − 1 to t, S k,t is the standardized news announcement for k = 1, . . . , 24 and P t and OF * t denote the bid-ask spread and the unanticipated order flow from period t to t + 1. Further, I = 3, J = 0, J ′ = 1 and Q = 5. In case of the public information variables, the economic significance is equal to the partial derivative of the conditional volatility ( √ h t ) with respect to the variable S kt . We measure the economic impact of the private information variables on volatility by first adding up all contributions of these variables to the conditional volatilities over all intraday intervals on each day. In addition we take the mean over all sample days. We round all values to integers. The sample goes from January 2, 2004 Claims changes volatility by two basis points on average. Hence in comparison with public information, the effect of private information is striking.
In summary, the results suggest that private information variables are statistically and economically significant explanatory variables for volatility. Higher absolute values of order flow and lower market liquidity signal the presence of a higher level of private information, which in turn increases the uncertainty on the Treasury market.
Extensions
We analyze two extensions of the Spline-GARCH model of the previous section to examine the robustness of our results on the effects of private information on volatility. First, we explore whether this effect depends on the state of the economy. In particular, we extend the model to allow for different effects during expansion and recession periods. Second, we consider whether the dispersion of beliefs among analysts influences the importance of private information for both returns and volatility.
Conditioning on the state of the economy
We investigate the effect of public information on returns and volatility conditional on the variable D E to be equal to one when the ADS index is positive (Expansion) and zero otherwise. A recession indicator is then obtained as D R = 1 − D E . Using these dummy variables for the state of the economy, the Spline-GARCH model is modified as follows:
where again u t ∼ N(0, 1), τ t denotes the public and private news component, and g t represents the unit-GARCH term. Table 6 reports coefficient estimates of the adapted Spline-GARCH model, together with Wald tests for the null hypothesis that β E,kj and β R,kj or β E,kj ′ and β R,kj ′ are equal. and Beber and Brandt (2010) , who find that surprises generally have a larger effect in the expansion regime compared to the recession regime. This difference might be caused by differences in the sample period, as their data set covers the period 1992-2003, while our 
where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t − 1 to t, S k,t is the standardized news announcement for k = 1, . . . , 24, OF * t denotes the unanticipated order flow and P t the bid-ask spread from period t to t + 1. The dummy variables D E and D R denotes the expansion and he recession regimes, which are constructed with use of the ADS-index. Further, I = 3, J = 0, J ′ = 1 and Q = 5. Panel A contain estimated coefficients regarding the return part of the model. We use the Wald-test to test on statistical difference of the coefficients during expansions and recessions. Panel B contains the volatility part. We show only the contemporaneous effect and discard the coefficients corresponding with the first lag. The superscripts * * * , * * and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The sample goes from In sum, private information matters for volatility, irrespective of the state of the economy.
The bid-ask spread has more impact during recessions. In addition, public information has a larger influence on volatility during expansions.
Conditioning on the dispersion of beliefs
We investigate the impact of private information on both returns and volatility for different levels of the dispersion of beliefs among analysts. This extends Pasquariello and Vega (2007), who study this issue for returns only.
We measure the dispersion of beliefs using the range of analysts' forecasts for the 24 listed macro announcements. This is slightly different from Pasquariello and Vega (2007) , who take the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts to estimate the dispersion. We follow their methodology for incorporating the dispersion of beliefs into the model. For this purpose, we first convert the weekly and quarterly dispersions to a monthly frequency. For the weekly announcements of Initial Unemployment Claims this conversion is done by simply averaging the range across four weeks. For the three quarterly announcements in our data set, GDP Advance, Preliminary, and Final, we assume that the dispersion of beliefs in the first month of the quarter is constant throughout the quarter. The monthly proxy for information heterogeneity is defined as a sum of monthly (scaled) dispersions across announcements,
where RA k,t is the highest minus the lowest professional forecast of announcement k at time t andμ(RA k,t ) andσ(RA k,t ) are its sample mean and standard deviation, respectively. Given the monthly dispersion estimates, we divide the empirical distribution function of SRA P,t in a low (0 − 30%), medium (30 − 70%) and high (70 − 100%) dispersion regime. Then we interact order flow with three dummy variables, which are constructed on these three regimes. In principle, it would also be possible to interact the standardized surprises with these dummy variables to allow for different effects of public information for different levels of dispersion. However, the range of the analysts' forecasts used to construct the dispersion measure is available only from June 2007 onwards. This implies that the subsample that can be used in this analysis contains only a limited number of announcements (30 for the monthly variables and 12 for the quarterly GDP figures), making it difficult to obtain reliable results. Table 7 reports estimation results for the Spline-GARCH model conditioning the effects of private information on the level of the dispersion of analysts' forecasts. We do not report the estimates for the macro announcements, which are similar to those obtained for the complete sample period as shown in Table 4 . The informativeness of order flow is considerably higher for months with highest dispersion in analyst forecasts, both in the return and volatility equation. We find a monotonic increase in the coefficients, indicating that the higher the dispersion, the more informative order flow is for return and volatility. To shed light on the economic significance of this result, the partial effect of a one standard deviation shock in order flow in months with high dispersion on the conditional volatility is equal to 3.35 basis points in a 5-minute interval. 15 As a comparison, the corresponding values in times of low and medium dispersion are equal to 0.85 and 1.18 respectively. Hence order flow is almost four times more important when dispersion of beliefs is high compared to when it is low. where R t is the 5-minute log return of the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond futures from time period t − 1 to t, S k,t is the standardized news announcement for k = 1, . . . , 24, OF * t denotes the unanticipated order flow and P t the bid-ask spread from period t to t + 1. We introduce three dummy variables, D l , D m , and D h which represent a low, medium or high level of information heterogeneity. Results below are for I = 3, I ′ = 12, J = 0, J ′ = 1 and Q = 5. Since the focus is on the interaction between order flow and the dummy variables, we only report the coefficients corresponding with private information. The superscripts * * * , * * , and * donate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample goes from June 
Conclusion
We study the impact of private information on volatility in financial markets. We design a unified framework, inspired by the Spline-GARCH model of Engle and Rangel (2008) , to study the relationship between public and private information and prices and volatility simultaneously. We apply the model to 5-minute returns and volatility for the 30-year US Treasury futures over the period [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . We use surprises in 24 key macroeconomic variables to capture public information, while we construct measures of order flow and the bid-ask spread as proxies for private information.
Our main finding is that private information significantly affects volatility. Private information is much more important than public information in this respect. The effect of a shock to order flow on volatility is more than four times larger than the effect of a surprise of the same magnitude in the most influential macroeconomic news announcement. Moreover, we document an interaction between public and private information effects on volatility. The impact of order flow on volatility depends on the dispersion of beliefs about macroeconomic announcements among analysts, with the effect being almost four times larger when there is high dispersion compared to low dispersion. Finally, we find that the effect of private information depends on the state of the economy, in the sense that the effect of order flow and the bid-ask spread on volatility is larger during contractions. Our results imply that risk managers, portfolio managers and regulators should take into account private information variables as a determinant of volatility.
